



HOMELAND SECURITY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

NEW HAMPSHIRE DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY

2022 THIRA/SPR Final Submission Report

December 29, 2022

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Acronyms

AAR	After Action Report
AFN	Access and Functional Needs
ARC	American Red Cross
CAD	Computer Aided Design
CBRNE	<i>(pronounced CEE-burn or CEE-burn-ee)</i> Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive
CDL	Commercial Driver License
CERT	Community Emergency Response Team
CI	Critical Infrastructure
CIKR	Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
CIP	Capital Improvement Plan
COG	Continuity of Government
ConOps	Concept of Operations
COOP	Continuity Of Operations
COP	Common Operating Picture
DART	Disaster Animal Rescue Team
DBEA	NH Department of Business and Economic Affairs
DES	NH Department of Environmental Services
DHHS-ESU	NH Department of Health and Human Services – Emergency Services Unit
DHR	NH Department of Natural and Cultural Resources, Division of Historical Resources
DNCR	NH Department of Natural and Cultural Resources
DOC	NH Department of Corrections
DoIT	NH Department of Information Technology
DOS	NH Department of Safety
DOT	NH Department of Transportation
EMD	Emergency Management Director
EMPG	Emergency Management Performance Grant
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
ESF	Emergency Support Function
ESL	English as a Second Language
F&G	NH Department of Fish and Game
FD	Fire Department
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FMO	NH Fire Marshal Office
GIS	Geospatial Information System
HAZMAT	Hazardous Material
HCC	Healthcare Coalition
HIMS	Hospital Information Management System
HIRA	<i>(pronounced HI-rah)</i> Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
HMGP	Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
HPP	Hospital Preparedness Program
HSEM	NH Department of Safety, Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
HUD	US Department of Housing and Urban Development
IAC	Information Analysis Center
ICS	Incident Command System
IED	Improvised Explosive Device

IPOC	Incident Planning and Operations Center
IRS	Internal Revenue Service
JTTF	Joint Terrorism Task Force
LEOP	Local Emergency Operations Plan
LMR	Land Mobile Radio
MACE	Multi-Agency Coordinating Entity
MCI	NH Mass Casualty Incident plan
MFM	NH Mass Fatality Management plan
MRC	Medical Reserve Corps
NFIP	National Flood Insurance Program
NH-CIC	NH Cyber Integration Center
NHES	NH Employment Services
NHHFA	NH Housing and Finance Authority
NHVIEWW	New Hampshire Visual Information and Emergency Watch Website
NIMS	National Incident Management System
OCME	NH Office of the Medical Examiner
PD	Police Department
PDAFN	Persons with Disabilities and Access and Functional Needs
PDM	Pre-Disaster Mitigation
PHEP	Public Health Emergency Preparedness
POETE	<i>(pronounced PO-eh-tee)</i> Planning, Organization, Equipment, Training, Exercises
PW	Public Works
RDD	Radiological Dispersal Device
REPP	Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program
RFP	Request For Proposal
RPHN	Regional Public Healthcare Network
SCADA	Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
SEOC	State Emergency Operations Center
SEOP	State Emergency Operations Plan
SHMP	State Hazard Mitigation Plan
SHSP	State Homeland Security Program
SIEM	Security Information and Event Management system
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SNHU	Southern New Hampshire University
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPR	Stakeholder Preparedness Review
THIRA	<i>(pronounced THY-rah)</i> Threat and Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment
TNT	Trinitrotoluene
USAR	Urban Search And Rescue
VB	Vehicle-Borne
WebEOC	Web-based incident management database
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Participating Agencies

A variety of State and Local entities participated in the THRA and SPR Process. Coordinated by The New Hampshire Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (NH HSEM), participants not only provided feedback and input for Threats and Hazard Scenario creation, but also participated in a review of 2021 information to develop the Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR).

Assessing the State's readiness helps to guide preparedness efforts, providing focus areas for those involved in a response.

NH HSEM would like to thank the following entities for their participation:

New Hampshire Fire Safety, Office of the State Fire Marshal

New Hampshire Fire Standards and Training & Emergency Medical Services

New Hampshire State Police

New Hampshire Emergency Services and Communications

New Hampshire Department of Transportation

New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services

New Hampshire Department of Natural and Cultural Resources

New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services

New Hampshire Information and Analysis Center

The City of Manchester

The Town of Bow

The National Weather Service

The State Climatologist

The Seacoast Regional Planning Commission

New Hampshire Department of Energy

New Hampshire Fish and Game

New Hampshire Department of Information Technology

SECTION 1: Report Overview

The Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR) identifies which threats and hazards would have the most impact on communities and identifies which capabilities need additional funding to support emergency preparedness and community resiliency.

Federally mandated THIRA/SPR results are used by States and FEMA to improve the funding support provided before, during, and after incidents. Currently, FEMA requires states to complete the THIRA every three years and the SPR annually. For the purposes of this report, “community” is defined as the State of New Hampshire as a whole.

This report contains three sections:

- **Report Overview**
 - THIRA General Overview
 - SPR General Overview
- **Threats, Hazards, and Context**
 - THIRA Step 1: Context Description
 - THIRA Step 2: Standardized Impact Estimates
- **Capability Assessments**
 - THIRA Step 3: Capability Targets
 - SPR Step 1: Assess Capabilities
 - SPR Step 2a: Identify and Address Capability Gaps
 - SPR Step 2b: Additional Functional Areas (POETE)

Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA)

The THIRA is a three-step risk assessment completed every three years. It helps answer the following questions:

- **What threats and hazards can affect our community?**
- **If they occurred, what impacts would those threats and hazards have on our community?**
- **Based on those impacts, what capabilities should our community have?**

The three steps are:

1. **Identify Threats and Hazards:** Develop a list of threats and hazards that could affect the community. Consider only those that challenge the community’s ability to deliver at least one core capability more than any other incident; the THIRA is not intended to include less challenging threats and hazards.
2. **Give Threats and Hazards Context:** Describe the threats and hazards identified in Step 1, showing how they may affect the community and create challenges in performing the core capabilities.
3. **Establish Capability Targets:** Use the impacts described in Step 2 to determine the level of capability that the community plans to achieve over time in order to manage the threats and hazards it faces. Create capability target statements for each of the core capabilities based on this desired level by identifying impacts, objectives, and timeframe metrics.

Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR)


The SPR is an annual three-step self-assessment of a community’s capability levels based on the capability targets identified in the THIRA. It helps answer the questions:

- What are our current capability levels and how have our capabilities changed over the last year?

- What gaps exist between the capabilities we want to achieve and the capabilities we currently have?
- What do we need to do to close the capability gaps or sustain the capabilities?
- What impact did different funding sources—including grants—have on building or sustaining the capabilities assessed by the capability targets over the last year?

The SPR follows a three-step process as described in *Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 201, Third Edition*.

1. **Assess Capabilities.** Based on the language from the capability targets set in THIRA Step 3, identify the community's current capability and how that capability changed over the last year, including capabilities lost, sustained, and built. Then, provide additional context to explain the reported data and its sources.
2. **Identify Capability Gaps and Intended Approaches to Address Them.** Determine the causes of the capability gap between the capability target statement and the current capability identified in SPR Step 1. Then, describe the actions and investments needed to close the capability gap or sustain the capability. The targets utilize the following color-coded scale to demonstrate current level of capability in comparison to the target.



3. **Describe the Impacts of Funding Sources.** Identify how relevant funding sources, including but not limited to, grant programs and the community's own resources, helped to sustain or build the capabilities assessed and describe how those capabilities were used in a real-world incident(s) over the past year.

A core capability is comprised of several functional areas in which a community may have a gap. Each FEMA-determined standardized capability target statement addresses one or more functional areas. In addition to the three-step process described above, communities also identify gaps in planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercises (POETE) for functional areas not addressed by the standardized targets.

- **POETE includes the five elements that each agency should be examining their own capabilities.** By examining their capabilities through each of these elements, a jurisdiction can better define their strengths and areas for improvement. While the quantitative assessment of capability change asks stakeholders to consider all changes, the POETE asks stakeholders qualify the capability change in these specific elements where sustainment and/or building investments were made or lost over the past year.

SECTION 2: Threats, Hazards, and Context

Methodology

THIRA Steps 1-2

During the THIRA Steps 1 and 2a, HSEM developed five fictitious large-scale scenarios that reflect threats and hazards identified by the 2018 State Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan (SHMP) with input from external subject matter experts (SMEs) to ensure that the scenarios, while as a whole unlikely due to the scale and magnitude, would be plausible. The 2022 THIRA was developed to re-focus threats and hazards, and to add two new areas – Pandemic and Transportation & Hazardous Materials. The Pandemic scenario was designed to reflect real world events and tie in the financial impacts. Transportation & Hazardous Materials was designed to highlight the need for increased training and funding of Regional Hazmat Teams. Additionally, both scenarios highlight the potential impact of messaging in different languages can have during times where immediate alerts must be sent out.

THIRA Step 2 was developed utilizing past standardized impacts, realigning estimates to reflect regional information and 2020 Census data.

Summary

In 2022, New Hampshire stakeholders reviewed the scenarios developed for the 2019 THIRA. In an effort to combine known hazards detailed in the 2018 State Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA) with the state's lessons learned over the last three years, past scenarios were re-envisioned and two new hazards were added.

The below hazardous scenarios were identified in no particular order as the most probable to occur and/or those that would result in the largest impact to our jurisdiction.

- 1. Coastal Flooding.** Describes a coastal flooding event caused by a Category 2 hurricane, with storm surge and extreme precipitation in the coastal area worsened by already saturated soil and an astronomical high tide.
- 2. Cyber Attack.** Encompasses extreme cold weather cyber-attack on wastewater treatment facilities, rendering treatment plants inoperable. The attack also allows access to the control functions of the Memorial Bridge over the Piscataqua River, preventing heating fuel from reaching NH Ports.
- 3. Extreme Winter Weather.** Describes the impact of statewide power and communication outages during cold weather and treacherous road conditions hamper emergency response efforts.
- 4. In-Land Flooding.** Significant rainfall coupled with above average precipitation causes widespread inland flooding of streams and rivers. This flooding causes significant impacts to roads and homes, as well as dam failures. Significant rescues across the state would be required.
- 5. Mass Casualty – Active Shooter.** Describes a Black Friday shooting at two local malls by multiple armed assailants coupled with IEDs in New Hampshire, as well as a shooting at a Massachusetts mall.
- 6. Pandemic.** Describes the extreme situations that could and nearly did occur during the COVID pandemic. This scenario was developed to show the magnitude of the impacts to New Hampshire's healthcare system and economy.

7. Transportation & Hazardous Materials Incident. Describes a train derailment leaking Anhydrous Ammonia in the downtown Manchester Area on a busy night with a baseball game and a full SNHU Arena.

Threat/Hazard: Coastal Flooding

THIRA Step 1: Context Description

Category:	Natural Threat/Hazard	Type:	Coastal Flooding	Terrorism?	No
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In early September, the Town of Hampton is preparing for their annual Seafood Fest where attendance is anticipated to break the previous year's record, with nearly 175,000 people expected to attend. There is a large hurricane out at sea, but initial forecasts indicate that it will not impact the State of New Hampshire. Overnight between Saturday and Sunday, an upper-level low over southern Canada begins to pull the hurricane toward the coast. At the same time, a blocking high pressure near the Canadian Maritimes blocks the path for the hurricane to move eastward out to sea. Much to the surprise of forecasters, the Hurricane takes a 90-degree turn and makes landfall as a Category 2 storm near Newburyport Massachusetts. With the eye of the hurricane making landfall just south of the New Hampshire Seacoast, the dominant wind direction coming from the east pushes a devastating storm surge into the seacoast. The timing of the storm surge aligns with the astronomical high tide, resulting in damage to 10 miles of New Hampshire beaches as well as 20 miles, or 50%, of shoreline protection structures. While the hurricane rapidly weakens after landfall, the storm's forward motion slows down and an onshore flow keeps water levels elevated. The remnant rainfall from the weakening hurricane remains over much of coastal and southern New Hampshire, leading to widespread areas of 10+ of rainfall. Rivers, streams, and marshes quickly surpass bank full and continue to rise until many reaches moderate flood stage. The severe precipitation is augmented by a very wet spring and early summer, which left the soil saturated.

Storm surge is combined with the astronomical high tide to produce a storm tide in excess of 5 feet flooding between 30-40% of Portsmouth, Seabrook, Rye, Hampton, and other coastal communities. Access to the town of New Castle, an island community adjacent to Portsmouth, is lost due to flooding, cutting off the nearly 1,000 residents. The water surface elevation along the coast reaches 9ft above mean sea level. Ocean water covers Route 1A, along with residential streets, and makes them impassable. Low portions of Route 4 near Dover and portions of Route 1 that cross through tidal estuaries are affected. Salt marshes and other low-lying areas are flooded, making foot and vehicle traffic impossible. Many homes and businesses experience flooding. First responders are unable to reach many areas due to flooding. Culverts are overwhelmed, washed out, and clogged with debris, contributing to flooding. The Seabrook-Hampton Bridge, nearing end-of-life, is damaged heavily and cannot be traversed. Flood waters damaged over 30 miles of rail along the Amtrak Down-easter line in through Durham, Exeter, and Dover and over 200 miles of local and state roads in the coastal communities. 10 fatalities were recorded due to drowning. 120 homes and buildings were destroyed, and 1,000 homes and buildings were damaged. Wide-spread power and communication outages affected 300,000 people for about a week before power and communications lines could be restored. 3 water/wastewater treatment plants and 4 solid waste landfill facilities in the coastal communities were severely damaged

and were not able to become operational for 7 days. The flooding also caused damage to gas stations in the flooded coastal communities resulting in gasoline and diesel ground contamination. The flooding and high winds also caused extensive damage to the buildings and grounds of the Wentworth-Coolidge Historical Site in Portsmouth, Wentworth Country Club, Wentworth Hotel, Great Island Common, and the Fort Start Historic Site.

THIRA Step 2 - Standard Impact Estimates

Impact Category	Estimate	Impact Category	Estimate
jurisdictions affected	30	people requiring shelter	10000
partner organizations involved in incident management	200	people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible shelter)	19000
people affected	350000	people requiring food and water	350000
people with access and functional needs (affected)	44000	people with access and functional needs (requiring food and water)	44000
people with limited English proficiency affected	15000	animals requiring shelter, food, and water	50000
customers (without water service)	350000	people requiring temporary, non-congregate housing	7000
customers (without wastewater service)	350000	people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible, temporary, non-congregate housing)	700
customers (without communication service)	350000	people requiring rescue	300
customers (without power service)	350000	people requiring medical care	2500
people requiring evacuation	150000	businesses closed due to the incident	8000
people with access and functional needs (requiring evacuation)	19000	affected healthcare facilities and social service organizations	20
miles of road affected	500	people requiring long-term housing	200
hazmat release sites	100	people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible long-term housing)	100
exposed individuals (hazmat-related incidents)	100	damaged natural and cultural resources and historic properties registered in the jurisdiction	40
fatalities	100		

Source Identification:

- Hazard mitigation plans (including Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment)
- Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)
- Modeling or Tools
- Prior year THIRAs
- Resource Inventory

Threat/Hazard: Cyberattack

THIRA Step 1: Context Description

Category: Human-Caused Threat/Hazard **Type:** Cyber Attack **Terrorism?** No

During the middle of an exceptionally cold winter, emails appearing to have originated from Federal Government agencies with a link to confirm facility points-of-contact were sent to municipal wastewater and water treatment facilities, as well as New Hampshire and Maine Departments of Transportation.

The water and wastewater treatment facilities of Concord, Manchester, and Nashua become infected from the cyber-attack, which subsequently affects the SCADA system and locks out facility personnel and gains control of the automated safety systems of the facility. The malicious actions allow the culprit the ability to adjust the chemical mixing of the water from 100 parts per million to 11,100 parts per million of sodium hydroxide, causing the water from these facilities to no longer be potable, as well as preventing water intakes to be shut off. Employees are not able to regain control of the system in order to rectify the chemical mixing. The citizens of Concord, Manchester, and Nashua connected to the municipal water supply are no longer able to use the water for drinking, cooking, or cleaning and must rely on bottled water for these actions.

Concurrently, an attack gains access to the control functions of the Memorial Bridge, which connects New Hampshire and Maine over the Piscataqua River, and disables its ability to raise to allow larger ships to pass underneath. As NHDOT attempts to solve the issue of addressing the hack, a power interruption to the bridge delays the response effort. Subsequently, the local hard wired auxiliary power to the bridge fails. As portable power is brought in, hookup is prevented by equipment failure and damage. Tankers carrying heating fuel are prevented from traversing the narrow channel upriver to unload at energy terminals and remain bottlenecked in the channel for weeks. The US Coast Guard works with NH Port Authority to coordinate the offload of cargo. Tankers are forced to slowly transfer heating fuel onto smaller barges to continue to traverse the river to unload. The slow trickle of fuel is not enough to keep up with demand. New Hampshire relies on oil as a source of home heating with approximately 42% of citizens using oil as the primary source of heat. The limited amount of stored heating fuel is quickly used up and companies are unable to deliver heating fuel to customers across the entire state, leaving them in the cold. ISO New England becomes involved to re-route incoming deliveries to Portland, ME and Boston, MA in an effort to keep fuel coming into New Hampshire. NH DOT and Maine DOT work to re-route vehicle traffic by using smaller bridges and detours.

THIRA Step 2 - Standard Impact Estimates

Impact Category	Estimate	Impact Category	Estimate
(#) jurisdictions affected	30	(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible shelter)	150
(#) partner organizations involved in incident management	708	(#) people requiring food and water	300000
(#) people affected	1377000	(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring food and water)	30000
(#) people with access and functional needs (affected)	150000	(#) animals requiring shelter, food, and water	20000
(#) people with limited English proficiency affected	60000	(#) people requiring temporary, non-congregate housing	100
(#) customers (without water service)	300000	(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible, temporary, non-congregate housing)	25
(#) customers (without wastewater service)	300000	(#) people requiring medical care	5000
(#) customers (without power service)	30000	(#) businesses closed due to the incident	4000
(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring evacuation)		(#) affected healthcare facilities and social service organizations	50
(#) miles of road affected	30000	(#) personnel	250
(#) hazmat release sites	5	(#) priority intelligence stakeholder agencies/entities	50
(#) exposed individuals (hazmat-related incidents)		(#) jurisdictions	30
(#) fatalities	25	(#) threat and hazard scenarios	5
(#) structure fires	50	(#) outreach events or activities	1800
(#) people requiring shelter	1000		

Source Identification:

- Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)
- Modeling or tools
- Exercises
- Fusion Center products and assessments
- Prior year THIRAs

Threat/Hazard: Extreme Winter Weather

THIRA Step 1: Context Description

Category: Natural Threat/Hazard **Type:** Extreme Winter Weather **Terrorism?** No

During a very cold week in mid-January, a strong coastal low-pressure system brings strong winds and mixed precipitation to the entire State of New Hampshire. Cold air damming near the surface causes freezing rain to accumulate, with Grafton, Hillsborough, Merrimack, Coos, Carroll, Belknap, Strafford, and Rockingham counties receiving over 1" of ice accretion within a 24-hour period. Northern New Hampshire receives wet, heavy snow in excess of 6 inches. The snow and ice combined with strong winds cause numerous downed trees and power lines power outages in 220 of the State's municipalities and land grants causing 550,000 customers in New Hampshire to be without power, and water and wastewater treatment plants experience operational failure due to the ice accumulation. The ice build-up also causes most telephone customers in Grafton, Merrimack, Coos, Carroll, Belknap, Strafford, and Rockingham to be without service for approximately two weeks. The State Emergency Operations Center is activated to respond to the incident. The extreme weather subsequently knocks out power to the building hosting the SEOC and forces it to continue running on emergency generator power.

Frigid temperatures associated with a cold wave are forecast to move into the region after the departure of the low-pressure system. Due to the extent of the damage to utility and public infrastructure and the forecasted cold wave, the estimated time of restoration to most customers will be approximately two weeks, with some not seeing restoration for four or more weeks.

Approximately 10% of the residents of Grafton, Belknap, Coos, and Carroll counties are stranded in their homes as they are unable to clear their driveways adequately for about 5 days after the storm due to an extremely low-temperature cold snap, and approximately 20% of that 10% are dangerously low on heating fuel.

The Seacoast communities experience high windstorm surge of 4 feet combined with an astronomical high tide resulting 13 feet rise in ocean levels flooding up to 4 feet in Portsmouth, Rye, Hampton, Hampton Falls, and Seabrook and approximately 10 miles of damage to coastal and flood-prone roads, the seawall, and beaches as well as damage to several registered historical sites located in those towns.

The snow/ice build-up and follow-up on foggy conditions results in several, multiple-vehicle accidents with 5 large vehicle fires and 8 fatalities on the I-93 bridge crossing the Pemigewasset River near Campton, I-93 at the Hooksett Tolls, and I-89 Interchange in Concord. Included in the accidents across the state are DOT plows and response vehicles that are now unable to assist stranded and affected motorists, as well as continued plow operations. The accidents and continued poor road conditions makes it near impossible for staff shift-change at the State EOC, and power outages affect staff ability to activate remotely.

THIRA Step 2 - Standard Impact Estimates

Impact Category	Estimate	Impact Category	Estimate
(#) jurisdictions affected	196	(#) people requiring shelter	7500
(#) partner organizations involved in incident management	1000	(#) people requiring shelter	7500
(#) people affected	1250787	(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible shelter)	1000
(#) people with access and functional needs (affected)	157600	(#) people requiring food and water	600000
(#) people with limited English proficiency affected	50000	(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring food and water)	12000
(#) customers (without water service)	600000	(#) animals requiring shelter, food, and water	285000
(#) customers (without wastewater service)	600000	(#) people requiring temporary, non-congregate housing	50
(#) customers (without communication service)	600000	(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible, temporary, non-congregate housing)	15
(#) customers (without power service)	600000	(#) people requiring rescue	250
(#) people requiring evacuation	30000	(#) people requiring medical care	15000
(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring evacuation)	4000	(#) businesses closed due to the incident	20000
(#) miles of road affected	18000	(#) affected healthcare facilities and social service organizations	230
(#) hazmat release sites	200	(#) people requiring long-term housing	3500
(#) fatalities	80	(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible long-term housing)	500
(#) structure fires	5	(#) damaged natural and cultural resources and historic properties registered in the jurisdiction	200

Source Identification:

- Real-world events
- Response Plans
- Hazard mitigation plans (including Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment)
- Subject-Matter experts (SMEs)
- After-Action Reports
- Other reports (government, academic, non-profit)
- Prior year THIRAs

Threat/Hazard: In-land Flooding

THIRA Step 1: Context Description

Category:	Natural Threat/Hazard	Type:	In-Land Flooding	Terrorism?	No
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During a record setting summer for rainfall in New Hampshire, with some locations receiving over 13 inches of rainfall during a 30-day span, another low-pressure system with abundant moisture approaches the state; preceded by four weeks of above average precipitation. The system brings heavy precipitation with 7-9 inches of rain across the state in a 48-hour period; some areas experiencing 3 inches in a single hour. This extreme precipitation is rapidly converted to runoff as the saturated ground can no longer support any additional water storage, and instead channels the rainfall into rivers, streams, and other waterways, causing a sudden flash flooding event that resulted in severe damage to local and state roadways, culverts, and bridges. The Merrimack River is seen to be 12 feet above flood stage.

The rapid rise of floodwaters occurred after dark and took many residents and visitors in the area by surprise, prompting first responders to assist residents. The summer months are busy with tourists and vacationers in New Hampshire, and waterside campgrounds across the state are full, causing the need to evacuate campers. Campers and hikers in more remote areas become stranded and difficult to reach; compounded by the influx of out of state tourists unfamiliar with the area. Additionally, emergency communication is impacted by weak phone signals.

50 roads, including state-owned roads worn down over the years, across 35 communities in the western part of the state have severe washout damage or are washed out completely, causing dozens of homes to be cut off from emergency services for 3 days. Route 12 in Charlestown and Route 9 in Sullivan are among the major roads in the west that are impacting the ability of emergency personnel's response. Severe residential flooding and washout damage to roads creates the need to evacuate another 50 homes. The widespread need for evacuation and rescue operations calls for the activation of Fish and Game's swift water teams. More than 5,000 homes and businesses experience significant flooding, and water and wastewater treatment plants experience significant damage to equipment due to overflow. Municipal infrastructure in 12 towns is severely damaged and result in local emergency response operations to be affected and delayed.

The State Emergency Operations Center is activated to help respond to the severe widespread flooding events in the western part of the state and in the Lakes Region and to monitor the dozens of poor and unsatisfactory High Hazard Dams in the state. Reports start coming in from towns across the state that several dams are nearing overtopping conditions or are at risk of failure. Media reports and communication from local officials come in that the Ashuelot Dam in Washington begins to fail causing the need to evacuate residents below. At the same time, the Merrymeeting Dam in New Durham overtops from the severe water rise and has a cascading effect on the Jones Pond Dam and Alton Power Dam. The risk posed by the overtopping dams necessitates that the homes below the dams are to be evacuated.

THIRA Step 2 - Standard Impact Estimates

Impact Category	Estimate	Impact Category	Estimate
jurisdictions affected	150	(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible shelter)	1200
partner organizations involved in incident management	1000	(#) people requiring food and water	20000
people affected	200000	(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring food and water)	2500
people with access and functional needs (affected)	30000	(#) animals requiring shelter, food, and water	38000
people with limited English proficiency affected	12000	(#) people requiring temporary, non-congregate housing	2000
customers (without water service)	75000	(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible, temporary, non-congregate housing)	200
customers (without wastewater service)	75000	(#) people requiring rescue	1500
(#) customers (without communication service)	50000	(#) people requiring medical care	2500
(#) customers (without power service)	75000	(#) businesses closed due to the incident	15000
(#) people requiring evacuation	10000	(#) affected healthcare facilities and social service organizations	30
(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring evacuation)	1200	(#) people requiring long-term housing	1000
(#) miles of road affected	500	(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible long-term housing)	120
(#) fatalities	50	(#) damaged natural and cultural resources and historic properties registered in the jurisdiction	50
(#) people requiring shelter	10000		

Source Identification:

- Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)
- Modeling or tools
- Hazard mitigation plans (including Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment)
- Other reports (government, academic, non-profit)
- Prior year THIRAs

THIRA Step 1: Context Description

Category: Human Caused Hazard **Type:** Mass Casualty – Active Shooter **Terrorism?** Yes

On clear but cold Black Friday when temperatures were around 35o F and a slight breeze approximately 10 - 15 mph, a lone wolf group of 15 people conducted a coordinated active shooter attack at the food courts at Pheasant Lane Mall in Nashua, the Mall of New Hampshire in Manchester, the Fox Run Mall in Newington, and the Burlington Mall, in Burlington, MA, by deploying two shooters to Fox Run Mall at 3 pm, the Mall of New Hampshire at 3:15 pm, Burlington Mall at 3:30 pm, and Pheasant Lane Mall at 3:45 pm. The shooters were armed with semi-automatic rifles and automatic pistols as well as military-grade fragment and smoke grenades. One of the shooters at each location was wearing suicide vests loaded with ball bearings. Small boxed improvised explosive devises (IEDs) were also placed at the main road entrances to each of the malls in order to disrupt EMS access to the wounded. At 3 minutes after each of the attacks at each location, two IEDs detonated at the Mall of New Hampshire; two detonated at the Pheasant Street Mall; and three detonated at the Fox Run Mall. The damage caused by these IEDs was relatively minor (approximately 10 feet of road damage per explosion) and resulted in no injuries or damage to first responder vehicles.

Due to the locations of the boxed IEDs, police and EMS were delayed 15 min response time. All 15 of the shooters were killed, and all 4 of the suicide vests were detonated. The resulting casualties were 25 killed and 80 critically injured at the Pheasant Lane Mall, 23 killed and 90 critically injured at the Mall of New Hampshire, 15 killed and 50 critically injured at Fox Run Mall, and 30 killed and 75 critically injured at the Burlington Mall. Massachusetts mutual support assets are unavailable due to the Burlington Mall attack. No police or fire personnel were seriously injured or killed due to the attack.

NOTE:

This scenario was chosen to highlight the increasing threat of active shooters and mass killings and the ease in which a small group could organize and accomplish this type of situation that would result in a huge impact on a community.

THIRA Step 2 - Standard Impact Estimates

Impact Category	Estimate	Impact Category	Estimate
(#) jurisdictions affected	234	(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring food and water)	645
(#) partner organizations involved in incident management	400	(#) animals requiring shelter, food, and water	200
(#) people affected	1500000	(#) people requiring medical care	6320
(#) people with access and functional needs (affected)	3150	(#) businesses closed due to the incident	500
(#) people with limited English proficiency affected	90000	(#) affected healthcare facilities and social service organizations	50
(#) customers (without wastewater service)	3	(#) people requiring screening	2625
(#) customers (without communication service)	120000	(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring screening)	315
(#) customers (without power service)	330	(#) personnel	2500
(#) people requiring evacuation	20000	(#) priority intelligence stakeholder agencies/entities	250
(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring evacuation)	315	(#) households	526710
(#) fatalities	235	(#) jurisdictions	234
(#) structure fires	3	(#) threat and hazard scenarios	5
(#) people requiring food and water	5125	(#) outreach events or activities	1800

Source Identification:

- Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)
- Real-world events
- Response Plans
- Exercises
- Other reports (government, academic, non-profit)
- Prior year THIRAs
- Other existing threat and hazard assessments

Threat/Hazard: Pandemic

THIRA Step 1: Context Description

Category:	Natural Threat/Hazard	Type:	Pandemic	Terrorism?	No
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In early October, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reports a new strain of a highly contagious and deadly virus spreading rapidly across the country. By the end of the month, the first case appears at Elliot Hospital in Manchester, New Hampshire, and over the next 3 weeks, cases and hospitalizations increase exponentially and continue for months. The surge quickly overwhelms the healthcare system as there are not enough beds to accommodate the influx of patients and hospitalizations reached over 1,000 over the winter for a span of 2 weeks. Due to similar experiences across the country, it is not possible to transfer patients to neighboring states. Medical equipment and supplies are quickly used up, and due to the national scope of the pandemic, supply deliveries and logistics from usual vendors are being strained, which causes non-traditional vendors and companies to make up the difference. The healthcare system continues to be strained as medical workers become ill and are unable to treat the patients as they become patients themselves. Major outbreaks occur in nursing homes and assisted living facilities, as well as state and federal prisons.

Additionally, elective procedures are cancelled across all medical service providers, while others forego medical services all together for fear of getting sick. First responders and essential services are disrupted due to social distancing and illness. Businesses close their doors to disrupt contracting and spreading the disease, resulting in a widespread loss of service, unemployment, and economic impact across the state, resulting in over 400,000 unemployment claims during the height. While most businesses have reopened after several months, thousands more are forced to close their doors permanently as the financial impact was too great. The impact of the supply chain also affects commodities, and grocery stores experience empty shelves and increasingly high prices on limited available items.

Due to disruption of business services and the impacts at grocery stores, tensions and frustration rise across New Hampshire. Protests involving thousands erupt in towns throughout the state including the cities of Manchester, Portsmouth, and Nashua. Already short-staffed law enforcement and first responder departments are further strained responding to these incidents and hundreds are arrested. Medical calls are delayed due to staffing shortages and concern over viral infection and priority.

NOTE:

Data included from COVID pandemic response. The COVID pandemic was not purely a medical response. Due to 'lock downs' economic impacts were felt by businesses, employees and consumers. Without federal funding, the state would have had a difficult time responding to these impacts.

THIRA Step 2 - Standard Impact Estimates

Impact Category	Estimate
(#) jurisdictions affected	234
(#) partner organizations involved in incident management	1000
(#) people affected	1377000
(#) people with access and functional needs (affected)	137000
(#) people with limited English proficiency affected	50000
(#) fatalities	6000
(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible shelter)	300
(#) people requiring food and water	135000
(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring food and water)	27400
(#) people requiring temporary, non-congregate housing	6885
(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible, temporary, non-congregate housing)	700
(#) people requiring medical care	137000
(#) businesses closed due to the incident	70000
(#) affected healthcare facilities and social service organizations	981

Source Identification:

- Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)
- Real-world events
- Hazard mitigation plans (including Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment)
- After-Action Reports
- Other reports (government, academic, non-profit)
- Resource Inventory

Threat/Hazard: Transportation & Hazardous Materials Incident

THIRA Step 1: Context Description

Category: Technological Threat/Hazard **Type:** Transportation & Hazardous Materials Incident **Terrorism?** No

At 2000 on an overcast Friday night in Mid- July, at a temperature of 70F and winds of 10mph blowing from the northwest, a train carrying Anhydrous ammonia is passing through Downtown Manchester parallel to Canal St. and approaching the intersection of Granite St when the train engineer notices a box truck stalled on the tracks. The driver of the truck was able to exit the vehicle, however, not having enough time and distance to stop, the train collides with the truck. The force of the impact and subsequent debris forces the derailment of the train and the damage of the tanks. As a result of the damage caused to the tanks, the Anhydrous ammonia begins to leak out. The vapor spreads over downtown Manchester and towards the Merrimack River. A fire quickly starts from the wreckage of the collision and spreads to nearby brush along the tracks exasperated by drought conditions and threatening the nearby local news station for New Hampshire as well as several other businesses in the area. The nearby stretch of I-293 and its exits are closed, and the subsequent plume of gas affects a 4 mile area south of the initial accident.

At this time, there is also a New Hampshire Fisher Cats Minor League Baseball game occurring at Northeast Delta Dental Stadium on Southern Commercial St. as well as a concert at the Southern New Hampshire University Arena at the corner of Lake Ave and Elm St. Additionally, the mild evening has brought hundreds of people walking downtown Elm St. for dinner and a night out.

THIRA Step 2 - Standard Impact Estimates

Impact Category	Estimate	Impact Category	Estimate
(#) jurisdictions affected	20	(#) structure fires	15
(#) partner organizations involved in incident management	150	(#) people requiring shelter	7500
(#) people affected	150000	(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible shelter)	4000
(#) people with access and functional needs (affected)	10000	(#) animals requiring shelter, food, and water	20000
(#) customers (without communication service)	75000	(#) people requiring rescue	50
(#) customers (without power service)		(#) people requiring medical care	750
(#) people requiring evacuation	38000	(#) businesses closed due to the incident	5000
(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring evacuation)	600	(#) affected healthcare facilities and social service organizations	15
(#) miles of road affected	5	(#) people requiring screening	15000
(#) hazmat release sites	2	(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring screening)	1000
(#) exposed individuals (hazmat-related incidents)	50000	(#) personnel	2000
(#) fatalities	25	(#) priority intelligence stakeholder agencies/entities	100

Source Identification:

- Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)
- Other Plans – Regional/Local Hazmat Response Plans
- Modeling Tools
- Prior year THIRAs
- Capability Assessments (such as the SPR)
- Resource Inventory



Section 3: Capability Targets

Methodology

THIRA Step 3 was developed utilizing updated Standard Impact Estimates, while utilizing the same capability targets already established for each of the core capabilities.

Data for the SPR Steps 1-3 was collected primarily using online surveys which enabled stakeholders to quantify and qualify key areas of sustainment and capacity building within each capability. In 2021, New Hampshire deployed an online survey to obtain information regarding capabilities. A virtual meeting was held so that stakeholders understood the information necessary to complete the SPR. This same information was utilized for the 2022 THIRA/SPR, however all respondents were given the opportunity to update the information provided in 2021.

Prevention	Protection	Mitigation	Response	Recovery
Planning				
Public Information and Warning				
Operational Coordination				
Intelligence and Information Sharing		Community Resilience	Infrastructure Systems	
Interdiction and Disruption		Long-term Vulnerability Reduction	Critical Transportation	Economic Recovery
Screening, Search and Detection		Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment	Environmental Response/Health and Safety	Health and Social Services
Forensics and Attribution	Access Control and Identify Verification	Threats and Hazards Identification	Fatality Management Services	Housing
	Cyber Security		Fire Management and Suppression	Natural and Cultural Disasters
	Physical Protective Measures		Logistics and Supply Chain Management	
	Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities		Mass Search and Rescue Operations	
	Supply Chain Integrity and Security		Mass Care Services	
			On-Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement	
			Operational Communications	
			Public Health, Healthcare, and EMS	
			Situational Assessment	



Core Capability: Planning

Functional Area(s) – Evaluating and Updating Plans; Operational Planning; Whole Community Involvement and Coordination

Capability Target:

Within every **4 year(s)**, update all emergency operations plans that define the roles and responsibilities of **713** partner organizations involved in incident management across **245** jurisdictions affected, and the sequence and scope of tasks needed to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to, and recover from events.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
In-Land Flooding	A large scale in-land flood resulting from a large scale post-tropical storm would cause the most disruption and occupy vast majority of ESF personnel in response and recovery actions.

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning

Functional Area(s) – Delivering Actionable Guidance; Alerts and Warnings; Culturally and Linguistically Appropriate Messaging; Inclusiveness of the Entire Public

Capability Target:

Within **90 minute(s)** notice of an incident, deliver reliable and actionable information to **1200000** people affected, including **128000** people with access and functional needs (affected) and **86000** people with limited English proficiency affected.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Pandemic	Messaging to a broad audience beyond local news stations was difficult during the COVID response. New Hampshire's staff responsible for alerting does not have the capability or resources to provide messaging in multiple languages. Providing accurate language translation on NH's website proved to be a challenge.



Core Capability: Operational Coordination

Functional Area(s) – Command, Control, and Coordination; National Incident Management System/Incident Command System Compliance; Stakeholder Engagement

Capability Target

Within **4 hour(s)** of a potential or actual incident, establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process across **234** jurisdictions affected and with **713** partner organizations involved in incident management. Maintain for **72 hour(s)**.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
In-Land Flooding	Large scale in-land flooding would cause the most disruption and occupy vast majority of ESF personnel in response and recovery actions.

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning

Functional Area(s) – Delivering Actionable Guidance; Alerts and Warnings; Culturally and Linguistically Appropriate Messaging; Inclusiveness of the Entire Public

Capability Target

Within **90 minute(s)** notice of an incident, deliver reliable and actionable information to **1200000** people affected, including **128000** people with access and functional needs (affected) and **86000** people with limited English proficiency affected.

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Core Capability: Operational Coordination

Functional Area(s) – Command, Control, and Coordination; National Incident Management System/Incident Command System Compliance; Stakeholder Engagement

Capability Target

Within **4 hour(s)** of a potential or actual incident, establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process across **234** jurisdictions affected and with **713** partner organizations involved in incident management. Maintain for **72 hour(s)**.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
In-Land Flooding	Large scale in-land flooding would cause the most disruption and occupy vast majority of ESF personnel in response and recovery actions.

Core Capability: Forensics and Attribution

Functional Area(s) – Attribution Assessments; Crime Scene Preservation and Exploitation; Evidence Collection; Forensic Analysis; Terrorist Investigations

Capability Target

Within **1 hour(s)** of a suspected terrorist attack, conduct outreach to the fusion center and Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in the community and identify **50** personnel assigned to support follow up information sharing, intelligence analysis, and/or investigative actions associated with the collection, examination, and analysis of evidence, as well as the identification of perpetrators.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Mass Casualty - Active Shooter	This type of event would cause considerable confusion and focus on the part of responding agencies until the situation is assessed and appropriately handled.



Capability: Intelligence and Information Sharing

Functional Area(s) – Analysis of Intelligence and Information; Developing Reports and Products; Disseminating Intelligence and Information; Exploiting and Processing Information; Feedback and Evaluation; Gathering Intelligence

Capability Target

During steady state, and in conjunction with the fusion center and/or Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), every **1 year(s)**, review ability to effectively execute the intelligence cycle, including the planning, direction, collection, exploitation, processing, analysis, production, dissemination, evaluation, and feedback of available information, and identify the **25** personnel assigned to support execution of the intelligence cycle.

Then, within **1 hour(s)** of the identification or notification of a credible threat, identify/analyze local context of the threat for the respective area of responsibility, and facilitate the sharing of threat information with **16** priority intelligence stakeholder agencies/entities in accordance with the intelligence cycle, and all dissemination protocols.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Pandemic	As seen during COVID, staffing and the ability to conduct business in person was a challenge during a Pandemic. While video conferencing is widely available, in-person work would need to continue.

Core Capability: Interdiction and Disruption

Functional Area(s) – Interdicting Cargo, Conveyances, and Persons

Capability Target

Within **1 hour(s)** of the identification or notification of a credible threat, conduct outreach to the fusion center and Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in the community and identify **50** personnel assigned to support follow up interdiction and disruption activities that may be undertaken against identified suspects and/or contraband.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Mass Casualty - Active Shooter	This type of event would cause considerable confusion and focus on the part of responding agencies until the situation is assessed and appropriately handled.

Core Capability: Screening, Search and Detection

Functional Area(s) – Screening; Wide-Area Search

Capability Target

Within **0 hour(s)** of notice of a credible threat, conduct screening, search, and detection operations for **15000** people requiring screening, including **1000** people with access and functional needs (requiring screening).

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Transportation & Hazardous Materials Incident	The type of Hazardous Material released would be a gas, that would also impact individuals quickly, and many would work to decontaminate without seeking medical advice. The gas cloud would move through the downtown area as first responders were arriving.

Core Capability: Access Control and Identity Verification

Functional Area(s) – Verifying Identity

Capability Target

Within **2 hour(s)** of an event, be prepared to accept credentials from **150** partner organizations involved in incident management.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Mass Casualty - Active Shooter	This type of threat/hazard is very difficult to control access because at the time of the incident, people are going to focused on either escaping the threat or providing lifesaving measures until adequate number of law enforcement personnel can arrive at the scene and set up containment.



Core Capability: Cybersecurity

Functional Area(s) – Guidelines, Regulations, and Standards; Sharing Threat Information

Capability Target

Every **1 year(s)**, appropriate authorities review and update cyber incident plans/annexes based on evolving threats covering **300** publicly managed and/or regulated critical infrastructure facilities.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Cyber Attack	This type of event would cause considerable confusion and focus on the part of responding agencies until the situation is assessed and appropriately handled.

Core Capability: Physical Protective Measures

Functional Area(s) – Physical Security Measures; Site-Specific and Process-Specific Risk Assessments

Capability Target

Within **6 month(s)** of completing a risk and vulnerability assessment, appropriate authorities review and update physical security plans covering **100** publicly managed and/or regulated critical infrastructure facilities to incorporate new information from the assessment.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
In-Land Flooding	A large scale in-land flood resulting from a large scale post-tropical storm would cause the most disruption and occupy vast majority of ESF personnel in response and recovery actions.



Core Capability: Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities

Functional Area(s) – Data Collection; Risk Assessment

Capability Target

Every **1 year(s)**, appropriate authorities conduct a review of relevant physical and cyber threats and hazards, vulnerabilities, and strategies for risk management covering **300** publicly managed and/or regulated critical infrastructure facilities.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
In-Land Flooding	A large scale in-land flood resulting from a large scale post-tropical storm would cause the most disruption and occupy vast majority of ESF personnel in response and recovery actions.

Core Capability: Supply Chain Integrity and Security

Functional Area(s) – Analysis of Supply Chain Dependencies

Capability Target

Every **1 year(s)**, engage **1500** partner organizations involved in incident management to promote awareness of threats, dependencies, vulnerabilities, and strategies to support restoration of private sector supply chains.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
In-Land Flooding	A large scale in-land flood resulting from a large scale post-tropical storm would cause the most disruption and occupy vast majority of ESF personnel in response and recovery actions.



Core Capability: Community Resilience

Functional Area(s) – Communication and Outreach; Education and Skill Building; Partnership Building

Capability Target

Every **1 year(s)**, conduct **1800** outreach events or activities to increase awareness of locally significant threats and hazards to help the residents be more prepared to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from those events.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
In-Land Flooding	A large scale in-land flood resulting from a large scale post-tropical storm would cause the most disruption and occupy vast majority of ESF personnel in response and recovery actions.

Functional Area(s) – Understanding the Community; Broadening the Use of Insurance

Capability Target

Within **5 year(s)**, **22500** households are covered by risk-appropriate insurance, including homeowners, flood, windstorm, and seismic.

Additional context necessary to understanding the capability target

Goal would be half of the homes in floodplain covered in NFIP.

In 2017, 634,000 housing units subject to moderate or high-risk losses.

45,000 homes in floodplains (500-year flood)

8,000 NFIP policies in NH as of April 2019

Within 5 years, 22,500 households (that is 50% of homes in the 500-year floodplain).

Focusing only flood insurance. (Not looking at homeowners' insurance because the majority of homeowners have homeowners' insurance).

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
In-Land Flooding	



Core Capability: Long-term Vulnerability Reduction

Functional Area(s) – Adopting Vulnerability Reduction Standards and Building Codes; Incorporating Mitigation Measures into Construction and Development

Capability Target

Every **3 year(s)**, **234** jurisdictions review their building codes, and, if necessary, enact or update risk-appropriate, disaster resilient building codes.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
In-Land Flooding	A large scale in-land flood resulting from a large scale post-tropical storm would cause the most disruption and occupy vast majority of ESF personnel in response and recovery actions.

Core Capability: Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment

Functional Area(s) – Modeling and Analysis; Obtaining and Sharing Data

Capability Target

Every **3 year(s)**, after identifying threats and hazards of concern, model the impacts of **7** threat and hazard scenarios to incorporate into planning efforts.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
In-Land Flooding	A large scale in-land flood resulting from a large scale post-tropical storm would cause the most disruption and occupy vast majority of ESF personnel in response and recovery actions.



Core Capability: Threats and Hazards Identification

Functional Area(s) – Estimating Frequency and Magnitude; Modeling and Analysis; Stakeholder Collaboration/Coordination

Capability Target

Every **5 year(s)**, engage with **234** jurisdictions and **27** partner organizations involved in incident management to assess the threats and hazards that are realistic and would significantly impact your communities.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
In-Land Flooding	A large scale in-land flood resulting from a large scale post-tropical storm would cause the most disruption and occupy vast majority of ESF personnel in response and recovery actions.

Core Capability: Critical Transportation

Functional Area(s) – Debris Removal; Establishing Access

Capability Target

Within **72 hour(s)** of an incident, clear **500** miles of road affected, to enable access for public, private, and non-profit emergency responders.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
In-Land Flooding	A large scale in-land flood in multiple regions of the state would cause the most disruption and occupy vast majority of ESF personnel in response and recovery actions.

Functional Area(s) – Evacuation

Capability Target

Within **72-hour(s)** notice of an incident, complete the evacuation of **30000** people requiring evacuation, including **4000** people with access and functional needs (requiring evacuation).

Additional context necessary to understanding the capability target

Evacuating assisted living could take up to 6 hours per facility. The State has enough special needs vehicles to transport approximately 200 people within 3 days. Takes approximately 4 hours to get vehicles across the State where it's needed. Used real-life event of the Keene



Cheshire Medical Center evacuation due to disabled boiler as example. Road conditions would impact the state's ability to evacuate individuals quickly.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Extreme Winter Weather	Many residents will be able to evacuate themselves to shelters, however, many would lack the ability to leave their property until roads and driveways were clear.

Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety

Functional Area(s) – Decontamination

Capability Target

Within **12 hour(s)** of a hazmat incident, complete decontamination procedures for **5000** exposed individuals (hazmat-related incidents).

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Transportation & Hazardous Materials Incident	The incident takes place in an area without warning sirens. A gas cloud would move throughout the area faster than alerting could indicate to seek shelter. While the plume itself would not last long, impacts to individuals outside would be immediate, and make treatment of impacted individuals difficult without some form of transportation to a decontamination site.

Functional Area(s) – Hazardous Material Clean-Up

Capability Target

Within **72 hour(s)** of an incident, assess, contain, and begin cleaning up hazardous material releases from **4** hazmat release sites.

Additional context necessary to understanding the capability target

While functional, the regional Hazmat Teams are also individuals from local Fire Departments. Personnel availability would hamper initial efforts, and crews from outside the coastal area would have difficulty reaching the site.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Coastal Flooding	Large scale coastal floods resulting from a large scale post-tropical storm would cause the most disruption and occupy vast majority of ESF personnel in response and recovery actions.

Core Capability: Fatality Management Services

Functional Area(s) – Body Recovery; Mortuary Services; Victim Identification

Capability Target

Within **45 day(s)** of an incident, complete the recovery, identification, and mortuary services, including temporary storage services, for **15** fatalities.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
In-Land Flooding	

Core Capability: Fire Management and Suppression

Functional Area(s) – Structural Firefighting

Capability Target

Within **24 hour(s)** of an incident, conduct firefighting operations to suppress and extinguish **50** structure fires.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Cyber Attack	Difficulty in accessing sites due to icy conditions. Frigid temperatures also make extinguishing the fire dangerous for firefighters.



Core Capability: Logistics and Supply Chain Management

Functional Area(s) – Resource Management; Resource Delivery

Capability Target

Within **72 hour(s)** of an incident, identify and mobilize life-sustaining commodities, resources, and services to **2000** people requiring shelter and **99000** people requiring food and water. Maintain distribution system for **2 week(s)**.

Additional context necessary to understanding the capability target:

There are enough identified shelters to house people for approximately 2 weeks, and contracts can be drawn up for commodities distribution (see NH Commodities Distribution Plan and Recovery Plan). New Hampshire has a known gap in this area, as we are dependent on the Red Cross for assistance with shelter and feeding.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Coastal Flooding	Coastal flooding resulting from a large scale post-tropical storm would cause the most disruption and occupy vast majority of ESF personnel in response and recovery actions.

Core Capability: Mass Care Services

Functional Area(s) – Relocation Assistance

Capability Target

Within **2 week(s)** of an incident, move **100** people requiring temporary, non-congregate housing, including **25** people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible, temporary, non-congregate housing), from congregate care to temporary housing.

Additional context necessary to understanding the capability target:

Space is very limited for temporary housing lasting longer than 2 weeks.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Cyber Attack	Winter weather would prevent alternative sheltering options such as tents, RVs, etc.

Functional Area(s) – Sheltering; Ensuring Access; Feeding; Hydration; Pets; Resource Distribution

Capability Target

Within **3 day(s)** of an incident, provide emergency sheltering, food, and water for **2000** people requiring shelter and **99000** people requiring food and water, including **240** people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible shelter) and **25740** people with access and functional needs (requiring food and water), and **100** animals requiring shelter, food, and water. Maintain for **2 week(s)**.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Extreme Winter Weather	Winter weather would prevent alternative sheltering options such as tents, RVs, etc.

Core Capability: Mass Search and Rescue Operations

Functional Area(s) – Rescue Operations; Search Operations; Community-Based Search and Rescue Support

Capability Target

Within **3 day(s)** of an incident, conduct search and rescue operations for **528** people requiring rescue.

Additional context necessary to understanding the capability target:

Adequate funding could build from 100 (current) to 528 in 3 years - mostly in a urban type setting- than wildland/forested - per NH Fish & Game.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
In-Land Flooding	A large scale in-land flood resulting from a large scale post-tropical storm would cause the most disruption and occupy vast majority of ESF personnel in response and recovery actions.

Core Capability: On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement

Functional Area(s) – Law Enforcement; Protecting Response Personnel; Securing Disaster Areas

Capability Target

Within **6 hour(s)** of an incident, provide security and law enforcement services to protect emergency responders and **10000** people affected.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Mass Casualty - Active Shooter	This type of event would cause considerable confusion and focus on the part of responding agencies until the situation is assessed and appropriately handled.

Core Capability: Operational Communications

Functional Area(s) – Interoperable Communications Between Responders

Capability Target

Within **6 hour(s)** of an incident, establish interoperable communications across **234** jurisdictions affected and with **500** partner organizations involved in incident management. Maintain for **2 month(s)**.

Additional context necessary to understanding the capability target:

Operational communications target based on response to unplanned, terrorist attack where communications crash due to be overwhelmed/overloaded.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Mass Casualty - Active Shooter	This type of event would cause considerable confusion and focus on the part of responding agencies until the situation is assessed and appropriately handled.

Core Capability: Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services

Functional Area(s) – Triage and Initial Stabilization; Emergency Medical Services; Definitive Care

Capability Target

Within **12 hour(s)** of an incident, complete triage, begin definitive medical treatment, and transfer to an appropriate facility **200** people requiring medical care.

Additional context necessary to understanding the capability target:



Currently NH has enough vehicles across the state to transport 200 people to appropriate healthcare facility. Drive time across the state would take approximately 4 hours at most.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Mass Casualty - Active Shooter	The sheer quantity and type of injuries would challenge NH capabilities.

Core Capability: Situational Assessment

Functional Area(s) – Delivering Situation Reports; Stakeholder Engagement

Capability Target

Within **2-hour(s)** of incident, and on a **1-hour(s)** cycle thereafter, provide notification to leadership and **300** partner organizations involved in incident management of the current and projected situation. Maintain for **72 hour(s)**.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Mass Casualty - Active Shooter	This type of event would cause considerable confusion and focus on the part of responding agencies until the situation is assessed and appropriately handled.

Core Capability: Infrastructure Systems

Functional Area(s) – Communications Systems

Capability Target

Within **1 week(s)** of an incident, restore service to **150000** customers (without communication service).

Functional Area(s) – Power Restoration

Capability Target

Within **1 week(s)** of an incident, restore service to **150000** customers (without power service).

Additional context necessary to understanding the capability targets:

Example: Post-Dorian, anticipate about 36 hrs. to restore 60,000, however, communications companies follow behind power companies so when power is restored, so are most communications. 2008 Ice Storm - 484,913 customers restored within 2 wks. according to AAR. Current household # is approximately 451,913. SMEs believe that approximately 100,000 restored within 1 week is more realistic than the entire state.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Extreme Winter Weather	Basing off combination of 2008 Ice Storm and coastal Winter Storm Grayson (2018)

Functional Area(s) – Sanitation

Capability Target

Within **1 week(s)** of an incident, restore service to **17314** customers (without wastewater service).

Functional Area(s) – Water Treatment and Provision

Capability Target

Within **1 week(s)** of an incident, restore service to **17314** customers (without water service).

Additional context necessary to understanding the capability targets:

ANNUAL COMPLIANCE REPORT ON PUBLIC WATER SYSTEM VIOLATIONS - states in 2018 NH had 2,515 active public water systems serving a population of 876,074. 2010 Census states that national average is 2.53 people per household. Water/wastewater customers would be approximately 346,274, however, only a percentage of these customers would be likely to be affected (percentage based on assumption that approximately 5% of all customers would be affected). Seabrook Station reporting that could restore power within 1-4 weeks depending on scale of damage.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Coastal Flooding	Most stations have approximately 24 hours of fuel for back-up generators on site, so long term power outage would require fuel distribution

Core Capability: Economic Recovery

Functional Area(s) – Reopening Businesses

Capability Target

Within **1 year(s)** of an incident, reopen **4688** businesses closed due to the incident.

Additional context necessary to understanding the capability target:

Target (Goal) number of businesses reopened assumed that approximately 4,688 businesses (4,688 = 5% of all 93,763 businesses in New Hampshire, NH Employment Security - Annual Report

2018) closed by a major event, for example a large coastal flood, and those businesses wanted to reopen with assistance from the State.

The 1-year time period is an estimate of the time needed to help those businesses reopen after the incident.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Pandemic	New Hampshire has identified funding Gaps in this area. With disaster declarations, Federal Funds may be available to impacted businesses and employees, however the state does not have the funding capacity on its own to assist businesses with full recovery.

Core Capability: Health and Social Services

Functional Area(s) – Healthcare Facilities and Coalitions; Social Services

Capability Target

Within **3 month(s)** of an incident, restore functions at **928** affected healthcare facilities and social service organizations.

Additional context necessary to understanding the capability target:

Restoring functions at impacted healthcare facilities has proven to be an-ongoing process. During the initial phases of the COVID-19 response, New Hampshire medical facilities were able to sustain operations through the state procurement system, and through executive orders that allowed for non-traditional staff to work in facilities, such as EMTs and the National Guard. The state's 73 Long-Term Care facilities were particularly hard hit by patient and staff illness. New Hampshire Hospitals did receive assistance through FEMA to assist with staffing and ambulance services in the winter of 2021.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Pandemic	

Core Capability: Housing

Functional Area(s) – Transition from Interim to Permanent/Long-Term Housing; Addressing Housing Shortages; Housing Accessibility

Capability Target

Within **1 year(s)** of an incident, **1214** people requiring long-term housing, including **140** people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible long-term housing), find and secure long-term housing

Additional context necessary to understanding the capability target:

Using national average of 2.53 individuals per household, total people requiring long-term housing would be 1,214; and total people with AFN requiring accessible housing would be 140. New Hampshire currently has very little available inventory. Alternative means of long-term housing may be required to meet this target. Housing prices and low inventory are difficult to overcome, as little new development is occurring.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Extreme Winter Weather	A large scale in-land flood resulting from a large scale post-tropical storm would cause the most disruption and occupy vast majority of ESF personnel in response and recovery actions.

Core Capability: Natural and Cultural Resources

Functional Area(s) – Environmental Preservation and Restoration; Historic Preservation; Damage Assessment

Capability Target

Within **3 year(s)** of an incident, restore **1** damaged natural and cultural resources and historic properties registered in the jurisdiction.

Additional context necessary to understanding the capability:

White Island Lighthouse on the Isle of Shoals has a walkway from the caretaker’s house to the lighthouse that was destroyed in a storm in 2007. The walkway was a significant part of the building and very important to rebuild. The State of NH owns and manages the property. The State worked with FEMA who declared the storm a disaster event to get funds to rebuild the walkway. It is important to find the right contractors who are familiar with working on historic buildings and the requirements at the federal level. Fortunately, a contractor with timber-frame experience was hired. Another fortunate situation was that the State’s Architect had just drawn and documented the walkway the year before so there was a good baseline to follow in order to rebuild. The project ended up going on for about 3 years from the time the event occurred, FEMA money was allocated, a contractor was found, and the work completed. This long timeframe was also due to several unique situations at the island including the fact that work could only be completed at a specific time of year due to the Tern population and that the materials had to be helicoptered in. The cost was approximately \$380,000.00. The project was award winning.

Of course, this is not always the case with historic properties that a project following a disaster would take this long or cost this much, but it certainly could happen as outlined above.

Which of your identified threats and hazards most challenges ability to achieve this capability target?	Additional Context
Coastal Flooding	A large-scale flooding resulting from a large scale post-tropical storm would cause the most disruption and occupy vast majority of ESF personnel in response and recovery actions.




Full Assessment

Summary

Target goal statements were validated by stakeholders in 2021 and revised in 2022 to match current capabilities.

Percentage of Target Achieved

This percentage indicates the level of capability the community currently has for the specified target statement, **not the capability as a whole**. Percentages are shaded according to the range below.




For example, New Hampshire, as a whole, can meet approximately 70% of the Public Information and Warning capability in the Functional Areas of Delivering Actionable Guidance, Alerts and Warnings, Culturally and Linguistically Appropriate Messaging, and Inclusiveness of the Entire Public, but this percentage **does not include** the Additional Functional Areas of Developing Standard Operating Procedures for Public Information, New Communication Tools and Technologies, Protecting Sensitive Information, Public Awareness Campaigns, and Traditional Communication Mechanisms.

'% of Target Achieved' may be an average of multiple impact areas. The SPR information following the Assessment expand any areas where averages were used.

Trend

The arrows indicate a change in the maintenance of the capability in 2022 using the 2021 results as the baselines. Several of the 2020 targets statements were revised in 2022 in order to represent the State's capability status more accurately according to the determined target/goal statements.






Most Progress Capabilities	Greatest Danger Capabilities
Public Information and Warning, Cybersecurity, On-scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement	Planning, Physical Protective Measures, Housing

Identified Gaps/Areas of Improvement

The identified gaps or areas of improvement reflect areas where stakeholders reported deficiencies even if that capability's designated target area is adequately achieved.

Please list three topics which require a training and/or education course(s) to be developed and offered in order to build and sustain core capabilities identified as shortfalls.	Physical Protection Measures, Situational Assessment, Community Resilience
Please list three training & education courses which are typically difficult to obtain but are necessary to build and sustain core capabilities identified as shortfalls.	Operational Coordination classes are difficult at the state due to the lack of qualified instructors for ICS-300 and ICS-400, as well as G2300.
Please list three training & education courses which are critical priorities for closing the identified preparedness gaps.	G2300 Intermediate Emergency Operations Center Functions, MGT-417 Crisis Management for School Based Incidents for Key Decision Makers and G191 EOC/ICS Interface.



Full Assessments					
Capability	Priority	Confidence Rating	% Target Achieved	Trend	Identified Gaps/Areas of Improvement
Cross-Cutting	Public Information & Warning	Target Statement: Within 90 minute(s) notice of an incident, deliver reliable and actionable information to 1200000 people affected, including 128000 people with access and functional needs (affected) and 86000 people with limited English proficiency affected.			
		M	5	70%	 Communicating with AFN and ESL, developing SOPs, media relations training, staff to support public information duties during an incident
	Operational Coordination	Target Statement: Within 4 hours of a potential or actual incident, establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process across 234 jurisdictions affected and with 713 partner organizations involved in incident management . Maintain for 72 hours .			
		M	5	100%	 EOC specific job aids need to be developed, lack of AAR-Improvement Planning connection, aging equipment, increase training and exercises.
	Planning	Target Statement: Within 4 hours of a potential or actual incident, establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process across 234 jurisdictions affected and with 713 partner organizations involved in incident management . Maintain for 72 hours .			
		M	5	100%	



Full Assessments					
Capability	Priority	Confidence Rating	% Target Achieved	Trend	Identified Gaps/Areas of Improvement
Prevention/ Protection	Intelligence & Information Sharing	Target Statement: During steady state, and in conjunction with the fusion center and/or Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), every <u>1 year(s)</u> , review ability to effectively execute the intelligence cycle, including the planning, direction, collection, exploitation, processing, analysis, production, dissemination, evaluation, and feedback of available information, and identify the <u>25</u> personnel assigned to support execution of the intelligence cycle.			
		Then, within <u>1 hour(s)</u> of the identification or notification of a credible threat, identify/analyze local context of the threat for the respective area of responsibility, and facilitate the sharing of threat information with <u>16</u> priority intelligence stakeholder agencies/entities in accordance with the intelligence cycle, and all dissemination protocols.			
		H	5	79%	→ Training courses and funds to meet specific needs of analyst topic areas, aging equipment
	Interdiction & Disruption	Target Statement: Within <u>1 hour(s)</u> of the identification or notification of a credible threat, conduct outreach to the fusion center and Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in the community and identify <u>50</u> personnel assigned to support follow up interdiction and disruption activities that may be undertaken against identified suspects and/or contraband.			
		M	5	92%	→ Equipment maintenance, CBRNE training, PRND.
	Screening, Search & Detection	Target Statement: Within 0 hour(s) of notice of a credible threat, conduct screening, search, and detection operations for <u>10000</u> people requiring screening, including <u>1260</u> people with access and functional needs (requiring screening).			
		L	4	17%	↑ Training new staff, having access to a collaborative database, CBRNE and HAZMAT training.



Full Assessments					
Capability	Priority	Confidence Rating	% Target Achieved	Trend	Identified Gaps/Areas of Improvement
Protection	Access Control and Identity Verification	Target Statement: Within 2 hour(s) of an event, be prepared to accept credentials from 150 partner organizations involved in incident management.			
		H	4	27%	↓ Staffing levels, identifying all technology assets, training on evolving cyber solutions, updating and implementing coop, collaborative exercises among state agencies, the Statewide Cyber Disruption Plan
	Cybersecurity	Target Statement: Every 1 year(s) , appropriate authorities review and update cyber incident plans/annexes based on evolving threats covering 300 publicly managed and/or regulated critical infrastructure facilities.			
		H	4	27%	→ Staffing levels, identifying all technology assets, training on evolving cyber solutions, updating and implementing coop, collaborative exercises among state agencies, the Statewide Cyber Disruption Plan
	Physical & Protective Measures	Target Statement: Within 6 months of completing a risk and vulnerability assessment, appropriate authorities review and update physical security plans covering 100 publicly managed and/or regulated critical infrastructure facilities to incorporate new information from the assessment.			
		L	1	50%	↑ Additional training; increase of 25%
	Risk Management for Protection Programs & Activities	Target Statement: Every 1 year , appropriate authorities conduct a review of relevant physical and cyber threats and hazards, vulnerabilities, and strategies for risk management covering 300 publicly managed and/or regulated critical infrastructure facilities .			
		L	4	9%	→ Lack training and staff.
	Supply Chain Integrity & Security	Target Statement: Every 1 year(s) , engage 1500 partner organizations involved in incident management to promote awareness of threats, dependencies, vulnerabilities, and strategies to support restoration of private sector supply chains.			
		M	5	33%	→ Undefined financial structure; inability to transport supplies; lack of trained staff



Full Assessments						
Capability		Priority	Confidence Rating	% Target Achieved	Trend	Identified Gaps/Areas of Improvement
Mitigation	Community Resilience	Target Statement: Within 5 year(s) , 22500 households are covered by risk-appropriate insurance, including homeowners, flood, windstorm, and seismic.				
		L	2	34%	→	Not all NH Communities participate in NFIP
	Risk & Disaster Resilience	Target Statement: Every 3 years , after identifying threats and hazards of concern, model the impacts of 7 threat and hazard scenarios to incorporate into planning efforts.				
		M	4	100%	→	Training new employees, updated equipment, conducting exercises,
	Long-term Vulnerability Reduction	Target Statement: Every 3 year(s) , 234 jurisdictions review their building codes, and, if necessary, enact or update risk-appropriate, disaster resilient building codes.				
		M	4	100%	→	Building codes are adopted every 3 years by town and state.

Full Assessments



Capability		Priority	Confidence Rating	% Target Achieved	Trend	Identified Gaps/Areas of Improvement
Response	Fatality Management Services	Target Statement: Within 45 days of an incident, complete the recovery, identification, and mortuary services, including temporary storage services, for 15 fatalities .				
		M	5	100%	→	Contracts for enhanced capacity beyond hospitals and funeral homes. Mass Fatality Plan exercises – planning delayed due to COVID-19.
	Fire Management and Suppression	Target Statement: Within 24 hour(s) of an incident, conduct fire fighting operations to suppress and extinguish 50 structure fires.				
		H	3	100%	→	Building codes are adopted every 3 years by town and state.
	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	Target Statement: Within 72 hour(s) of an incident, identify and mobilize life-sustaining commodities, resources, and services to 99000 people requiring shelter and 1000 people requiring food and water. Maintain distribution system for 2 week(s) .				
		H	3	50%	→	NH can provide for very basic needs for shelter, but has little ability to feed those in shelters.
	Mass Care Services	Target Statement: Within 2 week(s) of an incident, move 100 people requiring temporary, non-congregate housing, including 25 people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible, temporary, non-congregate housing), from congregate care to temporary housing.				
		M	4	45%	→	NH lacks temporary housing units and MOU's to establish them.
		Target Statement: Within 3 day(s) of an incident, provide emergency sheltering, food, and water for 800 people requiring shelter and 98000 people requiring food and water, including 96 people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible shelter) and 25734 people with access and functional needs (requiring food and water), and 100 animals requiring shelter, food, and water. Maintain for 2 week(s) .				
		H	4	76%	→	NH lacks the infrastructure to provide food and water.
	Critical Transportation	Target Statement: Within 72 hour(s) of an incident, clear 500 miles of road affected, to enable access for public, private, and non-profit emergency responders.				



		M	3	100%	→	Staffing shortages with specific requirements.
		Target Statement: Within 72 hour(s) notice of an incident, complete the evacuation of 30000 people requiring evacuation, including 4000 people with access and functional needs (requiring evacuation).				
		M	1	3%	↓	Staffing shortages, limited availability of equipment.
	Mass Search and Rescue Operations	Target Statement: Within 3 day(s) of an incident, conduct search and rescue operations for 528 people requiring rescue				
		H	4	19%	→	Training, equipment, lack of personnel.
	Environmental Response/Health and Safety	Target Statement: Within 72 hour(s) of an incident, assess, contain, and begin cleaning up hazardous material releases from 4 hazmat release sites.				
		M	3	100%	→	Training, equipment, lack of personnel.
	On-scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement	Target Statement: Within 6 hours(s) of an incident, provide security and law enforcement services to protect emergency responders and 10000 people affected.				
		M	4	100%	→	
	Operational Communications	Target Statement: Within 6 hour(s) of an incident, establish interoperable communications across 234 jurisdictions affected and with 100 partner organizations involved in incident management. Maintain for 2 month(s).				
		L	4	80%	→	Staffing to support planning, equipment updates/availability, new technology training, multi-agency/multi-discipline communications exercises, emergency type training for IT
	Public Health, Healthcare, & EMS	Target Statement: Within 12 hours of an incident, complete triage, begin definitive medical treatment, and transfer to an appropriate facility 200 people requiring medical care.				
		M	4	100%	→	



Full Assessments					
Capability	Priority	Confidence Rating	% Target Achieved	Trend	Identified Gaps/Areas of Improvement
Response / Recovery	<u>Target Statement:</u> Within 1 week(s) of an incident, restore service to 100000 customers (without communication service).				
	M	5	67%	→	Training, equipment, lack of personnel.
	<u>Target Statement:</u> Within 1 week(s) of an incident, restore service to 150000 customers (without power service).				
	H	4	100%	→	
	<u>Target Statement:</u> Within 1 week(s) of an incident, restore service to 17314 customers (without wastewater service).				
	M	3	100%	→	
	<u>Target Statement:</u> Within 1 week(s) of an incident, restore service to 17314 customers (without water service).				
	M	3	100%	→	



Full Assessments						
Capability		Priority	Confidence Rating	% Target Achieved	Trend	Identified Gaps/Areas of Improvement
Recovery	Economic Recovery	Target Statement: Within 1 year of an incident, reopen 4,688 businesses closed due to the incident.				
		H	↩	4%	➡	COOP training and exercising, depth of staff and equipment
	Health & Social Services	Target Statement: Within 3 months of an incident, restore functions at 928 affected healthcare facilities and social service organizations.				
		M	4	11%	⬆	Inter-departmental planning, depletion of resources due to COVID-19, gaps in planning for LTCF and hospitals for long-term surge. Ability to offer supplies to support facilities.
	Housing	Target Statement: Within 1 year(s) of an incident, 1214 people requiring long-term housing, including 140 people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible long-term housing), find and secure long-term housing.				
		M	4	0%	➡	Long-term housing, housing assessments, reconstruction of destroyed housing, rehabilitation of damaged housing
	Natural and Cultural Resources	Target Statement: Within 3 year(s) of an incident, restore 1 damaged natural and cultural resources and historic properties registered in the jurisdiction.				
		M	4	100%	➡	



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Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR)

The SPR is an annual three-step self-assessment of a community's capability levels based on the capability targets identified in the THIRA. It helps answer the following questions:

- **What are our current capability levels and how have our capabilities changed over the last year?**
- **What gaps exist between the capabilities we want to achieve and the capabilities we currently have?**
- **What do we need to do to close the capability gaps or sustain the capabilities?**
- **What impact did different funding sources—including grants—have on building or sustaining the capabilities assessed by the capability targets over the last year?**

The three steps are:

1. **Assess Capabilities:** Based on the language from the capability targets set in THIRA Step 3, identify the community's current capability and how that capability changed over the last year, including capabilities lost, sustained, and built. Then, provide additional context to explain the reported data and its sources.
2. **Identify Capability Gaps and Intended Approaches to Address Them:** Determine the causes of the capability gap between the capability target and the current capability identified in SPR Step 1. Then, describe the actions and investments needed to close the capability gap or sustain the capability.
3. **Describe the Impacts of Funding Sources:** Identify how relevant funding sources, including but not limited to grant programs and the community's own resources, helped to build or sustain the capabilities assessed by the capability targets and describe how those capabilities were used in a real-world incident(s) over the past year.



Core Capability Assessment: Public Information and Warning

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **90-minute(s)** notice of an incident, deliver reliable and actionable information to **1200000** people affected, including **128000** people with access and functional needs (affected) and **8600** people with limited English proficiency affected.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) people affected	1200000	1200000	0	100%
(#) people with access and functional needs (affected)	128000	128000	0	100%
(#) people with limited English proficiency affected	86000	8600	77400	10%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning	X	Planning		Planning
	Organization	X	Organization		Organization
	Equipment	X	Equipment		Equipment
X	Training		Training	X	Training
X	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
New PIO staff require training in Media Relations. More PIO involvement in exercises.					
Capability Sustained					
Continued efforts in messaging and equipment					
Capability Built					
	GAP	Capability Gap Description			
P	YES	There is currently no formalized plan for reaching populations with Access and Functional Needs (AFN) or English as a Second Language (ESL) populations.			
O	YES	Staffing challenges that do not allow the ability to address the planning and implementation of solutions in this area			
E	YES	Current emergency notification systems are designed for English only with the exception if Spanish capability in the IPAWS WEA messaging.			
T	YES	No training has been conducted that would facilitate reaching populations with AFN or ESL.			
E	YES	The State has not officially exercised its capability to reach populations with AFN or ESL.			



Core Capability Assessment: Operational Coordination

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **4 hour(s)** of a potential or actual incident, establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process across **234** jurisdictions affected and with **713** partner organizations involved in incident management. Maintain for **72 hour(s)**.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) jurisdictions affected	234	234	0	100%
(#) partner organizations involved in incident management	713	713	0	100%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
X	Planning	X	Planning		Planning
	Organization		Organization		Organization
	Equipment	X	Equipment		Equipment
	Training	X	Training		Training
	Exercises	X	Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Staffing shortages have made non-essential plan updates difficult.					
Capability Sustained					
The State has managed to continue to work with all 234 communities and have open lines of communication. Equipment continues to work, however dated it may be. Training and Exercises continues to reach out to as communities and partners as possible.					
Capability Built					



	GAP	Capability Gap Description
p	YES	EOC specific job aids need to be developed. Lack of AAR-Improvement Planning connection. Many SEOP Annexes require updates.
O	YES	Organizational structure is in place. Maintaining staffing levels to optimize the structure is a challenge.
E	YES	Challenge of aging equipment, especially the SEOC wall display.
T	YES	The State is limited in the number of trainings it can provide due to funding and staffing shortages.
E	YES	The State is limited in the number of exercises it can facilitate for partners due to staffing and funding shortages.



Core Capability Assessment: Intelligence and Information Sharing

Estimate of Current Capability

During steady state, and in conjunction with the fusion center and/or Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), every **1 year(s)**, review ability to effectively execute the intelligence cycle, including the planning, direction, collection, exploitation, processing, analysis, production, dissemination, evaluation, and feedback of available information, and identify the **21** personnel assigned to support execution of the intelligence cycle.

Then, within **1 hour(s)** of the identification or notification of a credible threat, identify/analyze local context of the threat for the respective area of responsibility, and facilitate the sharing of threat information with **12** priority intelligence stakeholder agencies/entities in accordance with the intelligence cycle, and all dissemination protocols.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) personnel	25	21	4	84%
(#) priority intelligence stakeholder agencies/entities	16	12	4	75%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning		Planning
X	Organization	X	Organization	X	Organization
	Equipment		Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Difficulty filling positions. 4 out of 5 vacancies filled.					
Capability Sustained					
Maintained relationships with partners.					
Capability Built					
One new position added.					



Core Capability Assessment: Interdiction and Disruption

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **1 hour(s)** of the identification or notification of a credible threat, conduct outreach to the fusion center and Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in the community and identify **46** personnel assigned to support follow up interdiction and disruption activities that may be undertaken against identified suspects and/or contraband.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) personnel	50	46	4	92%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning		Planning
X	Organization	X	Organization	X	Organization
	Equipment		Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Staff turnover					
Capability Sustained					
NHIAC personnel					
Capability Built					
NHIAC added a position for Deputy Unit Commander.					
	GAP	Capability Gap Description			
P	NO				
O	NO				
E	YES	Lack of updated equipment for some NHIAC entities would enable better product and dissemination capabilities.			
T	YES	There are more specialized trainings that staff should attend. Lack IAC specific training funding.			
E	YES	Investigate and implement available training.			



Core Capability: Screening, Search and Detection

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **0 hour(s)** of notice of a credible threat, conduct screening, search, and detection operations for **10000** people requiring screening, including **1260** people with access and functional needs (requiring screening).

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) people requiring screening	15000	10000	5000	67%
(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring screening)	1000	1260	0	100%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning		Planning
	Organization	X	Organization		Organization
	Equipment		Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
Resources remain stable.					
Capability Built					



	GAP	Capability Gap Description
p	NO	
O	YES	Limited state employees available to fill this role and eligible to receive Overtime for such a role.
E	YES	There are additional databases that could assist us in our role. Additional remote sensing equipment is needed.
T	YES	Training for staff in regards to handling HAZMAT and CBRNE detection.
E	NO	



Core Capability: Access Control and Identify Verification

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **2 hour(s)** of an event, be prepared to accept credentials from **150** partner organizations involved in incident management.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) partner organizations involved in incident management	150	25	125	17%

POETE Assessment:

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning	X	Planning		Planning
	Organization	X	Organization	X	Organization
	Equipment	X	Equipment		Equipment
	Training	X	Training		Training
	Exercises	X	Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
With enough notice, it could be possible to create network credentials for 18 partner accounts in a 2-hour window.					
Capability Built					
Current capability has been increased to 25 account creations per day.					



	GAP	Capability Gap Description
p	YES	DoIR: Although there is a plan for creating new access accounts, it is conditional in that: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. access requests and account creation are not processed outside of normal business hours; 2. the policies, procedures, and approvals that determine whether a user is authorized to access particular systems are defined per agency and per compliance requirement.
O	YES	DoIT: Lines of authority for approving network and physical access during an incident response is not clearly attributed to the DoIT Commissioner, the CISO, or their designee, where appropriate. The ability to provide required access to systems may be hindered if primary administrators are not available prior to or during an event (e.g., outside of normal business hours).
E	YES	DoIT Need a statewide and centralized multi-factor authentication and identity management solution to support electronic access to systems. MOUs and contracts are not yet in place.
T	YES	Training for staff in regards to handling HAZMAT and CBRNE detection.
E	NO	DoIT: No exercises, either discussion-based or operations-based, have been conducted to test the plans and familiarize stakeholders with plans and equipment necessary for the creation and revocation of network and physical access requests for an incident management partner organization during an incident response. Areas of improvement have yet to be identified and addressed.



Core Capability: Cybersecurity

Estimate of Current Capability

Every **1 year(s)**, appropriate authorities review and update cyber incident plans/annexes based on evolving threats covering **80** publicly managed and/or regulated critical infrastructure facilities.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) publicly managed and/or regulated critical infrastructure facilities	300	80	220	27%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning	X	Planning		Planning
	Organization	X	Organization		Organization
	Equipment	X	Equipment		Equipment
	Training	X	Training		Training
	Exercises	X	Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
Number of state sites has not changed					
Capability Built					



	GAP	Capability Gap Description
p	YES	The current Cyber Disruption Plan requires updates and revisions.
O	YES	A Security Response Team (SRT) needs to be organized as defined by the Statewide Cyber Disruption Plan (CDP). This team, as well as the other incident response teams, should meet on a regular basis to review response expectations, identify known deficiencies, and implement approved procedures to improve response efforts.
E	YES	<p>The DoIT Cyber Security Group (CSG) continues its efforts to configure and fine-tune the Security Information and Event Management, Security Orchestration Automation and Response are not sufficient to effectively detect or respond to threats to all threats in the State's modernized IT operating environment.</p> <p>There are some State agency and Operational Technology (OT) networks which are not being managed by one or more of these tools at this time due to various obstacles.</p> <p>Significant gaps exist in the Nation Institute of Standards and Technology conformance across the State's IT platform which increases risk.</p>
T	YES	Responders have not been trained in response procedures and interacting with contracted incident response service providers.
E	NO	The Cyber Disruption Plan has not been exercised.



Core Capability: Physical Protective Measures

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **6 month(s)** of completing a risk and vulnerability assessment, appropriate authorities review and update physical security plans covering **50** publicly managed and/or regulated critical infrastructure facilities to incorporate new information from the assessment.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) publicly managed and/or regulated critical infrastructure facilities	100	50	50	50%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning	X	Planning		Planning
	Organization	X	Organization		Organization
	Equipment		Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
Maintained existing plans and organization					
Capability Built					

	GAP	Capability Gap Description
p	YES	Plans have not been updated to reflect physical protective measures for future pandemics.
O	NO	
E	NO	
T	YES	Additional Training Needed
E	NO	



Core Capability: Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities

Estimate of Current Capability

Every **1 year(s)**, appropriate authorities conduct a review of relevant physical and cyber threats and hazards, vulnerabilities, and strategies for risk management covering **26** publicly managed and/or regulated critical infrastructure facilities.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) publicly managed and/or regulated critical infrastructure facilities	300	26	274	9%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning	X	Planning		Planning
X	Organization	X	Organization		Organization
	Equipment		Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Staff turnover and loss in revenue continue to impact agencies.					
Capability Sustained					
Plans have been maintained, and reviews continue to be conducted by trained staff					
Capability Built					



Core Capability: Supply Chain Integrity and Security

Estimate of Current Capability

Every **1 year(s)**, engage **500** partner organizations involved in incident management to promote awareness of threats, dependencies, vulnerabilities, and strategies to support restoration of private sector supply chains.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) partner organizations involved in incident management	1500	500	1000	33%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning	X	Planning
X	Organization	X	Organization	X	Organization
	Equipment		Equipment		Equipment
X	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Loss of personnel remains a challenge. Distribution Management Plans exist, but the training to execute the plans has not been conducted.					
Capability Sustained					
Contracts remain needed to support state efforts.					
Capability Built					
Lessons learned from COVID continue to help build strength in this area.					



	GAP	Capability Gap Description
p	YES	Continuous employee turnover creates a constant gap in sustained knowledge and response expectations. Redistribution of responsibilities to higher level departmental leadership has allowed for more consistency training and development of agent response. The State Distribution Management Plan has been updated, yet no MOUs are in place to support the efforts.
O	YES	Undefined financial structures as a proactive measure. Executive orders offered approvals and clarifications during pandemic response; however this is not the case in all response activations. Predefined or preplanned financial approval hierarchy save time at the onset of any activation.
E	YES	We do not have the direct ability to transport supplies or items on an emergency basis and must rely on outside agencies to provide this resource. There is not a dedicated list of available fleet assets to be able to support transportation of goods and resources.
T	YES	Training for SLISA and CPODs remains a need. State agencies need to develop a true plan for logistics in order for training to be impactful.
E	NO	



Core Capabilities: Community Resilience

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **5 year(s)**, **7700** households are covered by risk-appropriate insurance, including homeowners, flood, windstorm, and seismic.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) households	22500	7700	14800	34%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning		Planning
	Organization	X	Organization		Organization
	Equipment		Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises

Capability Lost
Capability Sustained
New Hampshire's Office of Strategic Initiatives continues to do community outreach regarding NFIP and the CRS
Capability Built

	GAP	Capability Gap Description
P	YES	Not all New Hampshire communities participate in NFIP.
O	YES	Communication and outreach.
E	NO	
T	NO	
E	NO	



Core Capabilities: Long-term Vulnerability Reduction

Estimate of Current Capability

Every **3 year(s)**, **234** jurisdictions review their building codes, and, if necessary, enact or update risk-appropriate, disaster resilient building codes.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) jurisdictions	234	234	0	100%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:	Sustainment Investments In:	Building Investments In:
Planning	X	Planning
Organization	X	Organization
Equipment		Equipment
Training		Training
Exercises		Exercises

Capability Lost
Capability Sustained
NH Building Codes require updates every three years, which must be adopted by the towns.
Capability Built

	GAP	Capability Gap Description
P	NO	
O	YES	NH Towns are not required to have designated code enforcement staff.
E	NO	
T	NO	
E	NO	



Core Capabilities: Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment

Estimate of Current Capability

Every **3 year(s)**, after identifying threats and hazards of concern, model the impacts of **7** threat and hazard scenarios to incorporate into planning efforts.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) threat and hazard scenarios	7	7	0	100%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning	X	Planning
X	Organization	X	Organization		Organization
	Equipment	X	Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises

Capability Lost

Continued staff turnover.

Capability Sustained

Continued relationship building with local communities and coordination of state partners.

Capability Built

Ongoing study of coastal seawall. NH DOT began project to rebuild parts of NH seawall infrastructure.

	GAP	Capability Gap Description
P	YES	Planning Expertise.
O	YES	Vacant positions.
E	YES	New and improved equipment in an ongoing assessment to continue to build capacity. Not sufficient stockpile of difficult to acquire equipment should there be a significant natural disaster, i.e., major ice or lightning event at a critical mountain top communication site. Modeling software to address coastal and inland waterways.
T	NO	
E	YES	This capability has not been exercised.



Core Capability: Critical Transportation

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **72 hour(s)** of an incident, clear **500** miles of road affected, to enable access for public, private, and non-profit emergency responders.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) miles of road affected	500	500	0	100%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning		Planning
	Organization		Organization		Organization
	Equipment	X	Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
State and local assets are well maintained.					
Capability Built					

	GAP	Capability Gap Description
P	NO	
O	YES	There are vacancies on the frontlines of road clearing operations requiring CDLs.
E	NO	
T	NO	
E	NO	



Estimate of Current Capability

Within **72 hour(s)** notice of an incident, complete the evacuation of **1000** people requiring evacuation, including **100** people with access and functional needs (requiring evacuation).

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) people requiring evacuation	30000	1000	29000	3%
(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring evacuation)	4000	100	3900	2%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning		Planning
	Organization		Organization		Organization
	Equipment		Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises	X	Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
Municipalities along with NH Fish and Game drill regularly to maintain proficiency.					
Capability Built					

	GAP	Capability Gap Description
P	NO	
O	YES	Statewide there are key staffing vacancies.
E	YES	The State has access to enough special needs vehicles to evacuate approximately 100 AFN within the designated timeline.
T	NO	
E	NO	



Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **72 hour(s)** of an incident, assess, contain, and begin cleaning up hazardous material releases from **4** hazmat release sites.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) hazmat release sites	4	4	0	100%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning		Planning
	Organization		Organization		Organization
	Equipment	X	Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
The state utilizes SHSP funds to increase equipment maintenance.					
Capability Built					
Capability Gap Description					
P	YES	Lack of long-term planning.			
O	YES	NHFMCO coordinator position will help organize the teams.			
E	YES	The North Country team had to turn their equipment back in after they disbanded. Equipment is very sensitive and requires calibration.			
T	YES	HAZMAT team member would benefit from HAZMAT Tech training.			
E	YES	Lack of opportunity for the HAZMAT teams to exercise plans together.			



Core Capability: Fatality Management Services

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **45 day(s)** of an incident, complete the recovery, identification, and mortuary services, including temporary storage services, for **15** fatalities.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) fatalities	15	15	0	100%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning		Planning
	Organization	X	Organization		Organization
	Equipment		Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
Staffing and resources available have not changed.					
Capability Built					
	GAP	Capability Gap Description			
P	NO				
O	NO				
E	YES	Enhanced capacity beyond hospitals and funeral homes to be able to support temporary refrigeration services within the state. Contract has ended with vendor to provide temporary refrigeration. Trailer deployment also required 72 hours' notice for deployment.			
T	NO				
E	NO				



Core Capability: Fire Management and Suppression

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **24 hour(s)** of an incident, conduct firefighting operations to suppress and extinguish **50** structure fires.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) structure fires	50	50	0	100%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning		Planning
	Organization		Organization		Organization
	Equipment		Equipment		Equipment
	Training	X	Training		Training
	Exercises	X	Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
NH Fire Academy has been able to re-start in-person training for Fire and EMS Staff.					
Capability Built					
	GAP	Capability Gap Description			
P	YES	Ensure that all fire department chiefs in the state sign on to using the state-wide Fire Mobilization Plan when facing a large scale incident within their jurisdictions and make sure there is clear communication and notification to the proper stakeholders when the plan is activated.			
O	YES	Mutual aid districts that are formed and not certified through the FMO.			
E	YES	Smaller agencies using outdated equipment.			
T	YES	There is a new training program being developed for the local fire departments so that they fully understand the purpose, benefits, and how to activate the state-wide Fire Mobilization Plan for when they encounter a major fire incident in their community.			
E	YES	Lack of opportunity and funding for local departments to conduct exercises together			



Core Capability: Logistics and Supply Chain Management

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **72 hour(s)** of an incident, identify and mobilize life-sustaining commodities, resources, and services to **99000** people requiring shelter and **1000** people requiring food and water. Maintain distribution system for **2 week(s)**.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) people requiring food and water	99000	1000	98000	1%
(#) people requiring shelter	2000	99000	0	100%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning	X	Planning		Planning
	Organization		Organization		Organization
	Equipment	X	Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises

Capability Lost
Capability Sustained
The State has the proper equipment and planning.
Capability Built

	GAP	Capability Gap Description
P	YES	State Distribution Management Plan is updated but has never been exercised.
O	No	
E	YES	Need an updated volunteer website.
T	YES	New position-specific training needed for staff.
E	YES	Will need to exercise logistics plan once completed.



Core Capability: Mass Care Services

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **2 week(s)** of an incident, move **30** people requiring temporary, non-congregate housing, including **15** people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible, temporary, non-congregate housing), from congregate care to temporary housing.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) people requiring temporary, non-congregate housing	100	30	70	30%
(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible, temporary, non-congregate housing)	25	15	10	60%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning		Planning
	Organization	X	Organization		Organization
	Equipment		Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
NH maintains a good working relationship with American Red Cross.					
Capability Built					



	GAP	Capability Gap Description
P	YES	Identify more robust resources and referrals for clients. The NH Recovery Support Function 4 was last reviewed in March 2015.
O	YES	A statewide Disaster Recovery Housing Task Force was not established since the creation of RSF 4 Annex to discuss response and initial recovery efforts pertaining to temporary housing.
E	YES	There is not enough formally identified non-congregate short-term housing options to meet the target without Federal support.
T	NO	
E	YES	Housing needs to be exercised fully.

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **3 day(s)** of an incident, provide emergency sheltering, food, and water for **800** people requiring shelter and **98000** people requiring food and water, including **96** people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible shelter) and **25734** people with access and functional needs (requiring food and water), and **100** animals requiring shelter, food, and water. Maintain for **2 week(s)**.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) animals requiring shelter, food, and water	100	100	0	100%
(#) people requiring food and water	99000	98000	1000	99%
(#) people requiring shelter	2000	800	1200	40%
(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible shelter)	240	96	144	40%
(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring food and water)	25740	25734	6	100%



POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning	X	Planning		Planning
	Organization		Organization		Organization
	Equipment		Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
DHHS and RPH maintain good communication and are quick to identify areas where assistance is necessary for success.					
Capability Built					
	GAP	Capability Gap Description			
p	YES	State workgroup has been established to address the mass feeding gap in the state.			
O	YES	Recent transition of the NH DART program to DHHS ESU. The ARC shelter staff within the region would need to be supplemented to meet the goal of sheltering 2,000 people for 2 weeks following a disaster. This could be accomplished through partner agencies and the deployment of Red Cross workers from elsewhere in the country.			
E	YES	Most Regional Public Health Networks (RPHN) have caches of shelter durable medical equipment, cots, and communication access devices and other equipment. Need to update what each RPHN has in place. DART trailers have identified several equipment deficiencies. The ARC's ability to source meals has been reduced in 2019 due to the loss of several Sodexo contracts.			
T	YES	Regional shelter management teams need additional training of ARC, NH Civilian Emergency Response Team (CERT) and NH MRCs.			
E	YES	Some RPHN have included limited animal sheltering operations in their general population shelter management trainings, but very few include animal-focus private sector partner in exercises.			



Core Capability: Mass Search and Rescue Operations

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **3 day(s)** of an incident, conduct search and rescue operations for **100** people requiring rescue.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) people requiring rescue	528	100	428	19%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning		Planning
	Organization		Organization		Organization
	Equipment		Equipment		Equipment
	Training	X	Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
Local and State SAR Teams continue to drill to maintain proficiency.					
Capability Built					

	GAP	Capability Gap Description
P	YES	The State does not currently use resource typing and credentialing which could hinder response efforts or mutual aid requests.
O	YES	Loss of swift water team this year, and staff turnover has had an impact on response capabilities.
E	YES	Not all teams have sufficient equipment to meet FEMA team requirements.
T	YES	The State does not have enough trained personnel to meet FEMA goals.
E	YES	Lack of regular exercises focused on SAR and cross-state support.

Core Capability: On-scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **6 hour(s)** of an incident, provide security and law enforcement services to protect emergency responders and **10000** people affected.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) people affected	10000	10000	0	100%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning		Planning
X	Organization		Organization		Organization
	Equipment	X	Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Law Enforcement is struggling with staffing challenges.					
Capability Sustained					
Necessary equipment is on hand for law enforcement personnel.					
Capability Built					

	GAP	Capability Gap Description
P	YES	Adapting new plans to new and emerging threats.
O	YES	Numerous officer vacancies exist throughout the State. Shortage of qualified candidates.
E	YES	Aging equipment with insufficient funding to replace or build.
T	YES	Ensuring timely training for new and emerging threats for all sworn personnel.
E	YES	Ensuring all shifts/rotations/units have ability to exercise plans to build depth in the event of an emergency response.



Core Capability: Operational Communications

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **6 hour(s)** of an incident, establish interoperable communications across **234** jurisdictions affected and with **100** partner organizations involved in incident management. Maintain for **2 month(s)**.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) jurisdictions affected	234	234	0	100%
(#) partner organizations involved in incident management	500	100	400	20%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning		Planning
	Organization		Organization		Organization
	Equipment	X	Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
NH continues to sustain its current level of interoperability.					
Capability Built					
	GAP	Capability Gap Description			
P	YES	Further participation and formalization of planning efforts is desired.			
O	YES	We still have some vacant positions to fill.			
E	YES	Much of our equipment is outdated. There are geographical areas that have coverage gaps.			
T	YES	Many responders and others need training in use of communications equipment.			
E	YES	Seeking further participants.			



Core Capability: Public Health, Healthcare and Emergency Services

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **12 hour(s)** of an incident, complete triage, begin definitive medical treatment, and transfer to an appropriate facility **200** people requiring medical care.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) people requiring medical care	200	200	0	100%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning		Planning
	Organization	X	Organization		Organization
	Equipment		Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
New Hampshire continues to maintain appropriate staffing rosters.					
Capability Built					

	GAP	Capability Gap Description
P	NO	
O	NO	
E	NO	
T	YES	Continuing to train additional people.
E	NO	



Core Capability: Infrastructure Systems

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **1 week(s)** of an incident, restore service to **100000** customers (without communication service).

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) customers (without communication service)	150000	100000	50000	67%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning		Planning
	Organization		Organization		Organization
	Equipment	X	Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
NH can restore LMR for first responder agencies.					
Capability Built					
	GAP	Capability Gap Description			
p	NO				
O	YES	We must rely on support from others to re-establish private and public communications. Vacant positions.			
E	YES	Additional deployable assets are required to efficiently respond to outages.			
T	YES	Additional IT training required due to communications systems becoming IP based.			
E	YES	Need to ensure a communications element is included in every exercise.			



Estimate of Current Capability

Within **1 week(s)** of an incident, restore service to **150000** customers (without power service).

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) customers (without power service)	150000	150000	0	100%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning		Planning
	Organization	X	Organization	X	Organization
	Equipment		Equipment	X	Equipment
	Training	X	Training		Training
	Exercises	X	Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
NH continues to maintain good relationships with local utility companies.					
Capability Built					
Pre-staging line crews and being able to obtain contractor assistance was key.					

	GAP	Capability Gap Description
P	NO	
O	NO	
E	NO	
T	NO	
E	YES	Insufficient participation in exercises



Estimate of Current Capability

Within **1 week(s)** of an incident, restore service to **17314** customers (without wastewater service).

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) customers (without wastewater service)	17314	17314	0	100%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning		Planning
	Organization		Organization		Organization
	Equipment	X	Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
Capable of maintaining equipment and supplies.					
Capability Built					

	GAP	Capability Gap Description
p	YES	Additional planning to include large scale disruptions of wastewater services.
O	YES	Staffing concerns.
E	NO	
T	YES	Incident response training for plant personnel.
E	YES	The municipalities may not have the resources to develop a training exercise to simulate a potential event.



Estimate of Current Capability

Within **1 week(s)** of an incident, restore service to **17314** customers (without water service).

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) customers (without water service)	17314	17314	0	100%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning		Planning
	Organization		Organization		Organization
	Equipment	X	Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
Continued sustainment of equipment.					
Capability Built					
	GAP	Capability Gap Description			
P	YES	Community water systems have their own emergency plan. Not all plans are adequate.			
O	YES	Staffing concerns.			
E	NO				
T	YES	Currently can only meet minimum training requirements for certifications			
E	YES	Insufficient time for planning and implementing exercises.			



Core Capability: Economic Recovery

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **1 year(s)** of an incident, reopen **192** businesses closed due to the incident.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) businesses closed due to the incident	4688	192	4496	4%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning	X	Planning	X	Planning
	Organization	X	Organization		Organization
	Equipment		Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
Maintained existing planning and organization.					
Capability Built					
Developing new plans to handle the pandemic's economic impact and recovery activities.					

	GAP	Capability Gap Description
P	YES	COOP plan has been developed and technology use and adoption was put into place in 2020 during state of emergency.
O	YES	While the agency has released a strategic plan, we've faced challenges with hiring staff due to retirements, etc. It's been a slow process. We may technically up to staff now, however with the addition of federal funding opportunities and programs administered by BEA and partners, staffing may quickly become a gap soon.
E	YES	BEA depends on DoIT for all of our hardware and software needs including cloud-based services.
T	YES	BEA has made training/professional development an area of interest and budgeted to support trainings, however not all staff is aware of how to request approval and funding for a training. More internal communications need to take place.
E	NO	



Core Capability: Health and Social Service

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **3 month(s)** of an incident, restore functions at **100** affected healthcare facilities and social service organizations.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) affected healthcare facilities and social service organizations	928	100	828	11%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
X	Planning		Planning		Planning
X	Organization	X	Organization		Organization
	Equipment	X	Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises

Capability Lost

NH resources are stretched due to COVID19 impact. It is obvious that the existing infrastructure is not sufficient for a pandemic disaster.

Capability Sustained

The State would be able to support the basic function of approximately 100 healthcare facilities.

Capability Built

	GAP	Capability Gap Description
P	YES	COVID19 has identified many gaps in our planning, mostly for long-term care facilities and hospitals for long-term medical surges.
O	YES	Incorporate GSHCC statewide partners within ESF-8.
E	NO	
T	NO	
E	NO	



Core Capability: Housing

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **1 year(s)** of an incident, **0** people requiring long-term housing, including **0** people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible long-term housing), find and secure long-term housing.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) people requiring long-term housing	1214	0	1214	0%
(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible long-term housing)	140	0	140	0%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning		Planning
	Organization		Organization		Organization
	Equipment		Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
Capability Built					
	GAP	Capability Gap Description			
P	YES	Current plans do not anticipate NHHFA's response to disaster recovery, nor do legislative foundations allow for use of available funds for disaster recovery.			
O	YES	NHHFA is not staffed to provide disaster assistance.			
E	YES	Even during day-to-day operations, there is a severe shortage of long-term housing for the State's homeless, rehabilitated and low-income populations.			
T	YES	NHHFA staff have no specific training relative to emergency response.			
E	YES	Long-term housing plans need to be exercised fully.			



Core Capability: Natural and Cultural Resources

Estimate of Current Capability

Within **3 year(s)** of an incident, restore **1** damaged natural and cultural resources and historic properties registered in the jurisdiction.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Estimated Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) damaged natural and cultural resources and historic properties registered in the jurisdiction	1	1	0	100%

POETE ASSESSMENT

Capability Lost In:		Sustainment Investments In:		Building Investments In:	
	Planning		Planning		Planning
	Organization	X	Organization		Organization
	Equipment		Equipment		Equipment
	Training		Training		Training
	Exercises		Exercises		Exercises
Capability Lost					
Capability Sustained					
Department of Natural and Cultural Resources (DNCR) works with local entities to ensure restorations are done in accordance with national standards.					
Capability Built					

	GAP	Capability Gap Description
P	YES	DHR does not have a comprehensive inventory of all potentially historic resources statewide.
O	YES	DHR has no full-time staff dedicated to disaster preparedness and planning.
E	NO	
T	NO	
E	NO	

